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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The state appeals from the district court's order granting Terry R. Smith's
motion to suppress.

Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings
Soda Springs Police Officer Tyler Scheierman conducted a traffic stop of
Smith's jeep for speeding on Highway 30. (Tr., p.4, Ls.7-12; p.8, L.16 - p.g. L.2.)
Officer Scheierman approached the passenger side of Smith's jeep and knocked
on the vehicle's window. (R., p.75; Tr., p.9, Ls.3-10.) Smith rolled his window
down six to seven inches. (R., p.75.) Officer Scheierman requested that Smith
roll down the window all the way, and Smith complied. (Tr., p.10, Ls.2-13.)
Officer Scheierman informed Smith that he had observed him speeding,
and instructed Smith to present his license, registration, and proof of insurance.
(Tr., p.10, L.14 - p.11, L.1.) Officer Scheierman noticed the vehicle contained
several maps in the glove compartment and center console, so he inquired about
Smith's travels.

(R., pp.76-79; Tr., p.11, Ls.7-10; p.13, Ls.1-3.) Smith hesitated,

looked at the floor, and stated that he was on vacation and visiting friends in
several different states.

(R., pp.77-79; Tr., p.11, L.7 - p.12, L.8.)

Officer

Scheierman observed that the jeep had a "lived in" appearance and that there did
not appear to be a sufficient amount of luggage for Smith to be on vacation. (R.,
pp.80-81; Tr., p.12, L.9 - p.13, L.3.) This initial contact at Smith's vehicle lasted
approximately five to seven minutes, including the time it took Smith to retrieve
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his driver's license and relevant documents.

(R., pp.80-81; Tr., p.11, Ls.2-4;

p.34, L.15 - p.35, L.6.)
Officer Scheierman then returned to his patrol vehicle where he ran a
state warrant check on his in-car computer and requested backup through
dispatch. (R., p.82; Tr., p.13, L.12 - p.14, L.24.) Approximately one minute later,
the check completed and revealed no outstanding warrants. (Tr., p.14, Ls.13-20;
p.39, Ls.7-9.)

Officer Scheierman then initiated a "nationwide check" through

dispatch to check for any national criminal warrants or driver's license
suspensions - a check he performs during every traffic stop. (R., p.83; Tr., p.13,
Ls.16-20.) This "nationwide check" typically takes approximately five minutes to
complete. (Tr., p.15, Ls.14-24.)
While the "nationwide check" was being processed by dispatch, Officer
Scheierman left his patrol vehicle and asked Smith to exit his jeep. (Tr., p.16,
Ls.4-5.)

Officer Scheierman then resumed his inquiries about Smith's travels.

(Tr., p.16, Ls.8-14.)

Smith again "had to think about it," and stated that he was

visiting friends in Utah and Nevada, but was evasive and could not provide either
the names of the friends he claimed to be visiting or any specific places he had
been.

(R., pp.84-85; Tr., p.16, Ls.10-14.)

At this time, Officer Scheierman

noticed that Smith's eyes were "glassy and glazed over," which he recognized as
a common indicator of marijuana use.

(R., p.85; Tr., p.16, Ls.14-20.)

Officer

Scheierman then asked Smith if he used marijuana, and Smith acknowledged
that he possessed a Colorado medical marijuana card and ingested marijuana
through food. (Tr., p.17, L.9 - p.18, L.1.) Officer Scheierman could not recall if
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Smith told him when he last ingested marijuana.

(Tr., p.17, L.23 - p.18, L.1.)

Smith then declined Officer Scheierman's request to search his vehicle.

(R,

pp.86-87; Tr., p.18, Ls.9-14.)
As Officer Scheierman returned to his patrol car, the results of the
"nationwide check" came back through dispatch and revealed no outstanding
warrants or driver's license suspensions. (R., pp.87, 95-96; Tr., p.23, Ls.3-13;
p.30, Ls.6-10.) Officer Scheierman then retrieved his drug-sniffing dog from his
patrol vehicle and returned to Smith's jeep.

(Tr., p.18, Ls.15-19.)

Almost

immediately after deployment, the dog alerted on the rear of Smith's jeep. (R,
p.99; Tr., p.23, L.14 - p.25, L.23.)

Officer Scheierman then searched Smith's

vehicle and recovered approximately eight pounds of marijuana. (R, p.89; Tr.,
p.25, L.10 - p.26, L.17.) The entire traffic stop lasted approximately 15 minutes,
and concluded when Officer Scheierman arrested Smith.

(R, p.91; Tr., p.28,

Ls.13-18.)
The state charged Smith with marijuana trafficking. (R., p.26.) Smith filed
a motion to suppress the evidence found in his jeep,1 contending that Officer
Scheierman unlawfully extended the traffic stop beyond its original purpose. (R,
ppAO-50.)

After a hearing, the district court made relevant factual findings

consistent with the facts described above, and granted Smith's motion.

(R,

pp.148-168; see generally Tr.) The state timely appealed. (R, pp.174-177.)

1 Smith entitled his motion, "motion to dismiss," but the district court construed it
as a motion to suppress the evidence recovered from Smith's jeep. (R., p.148,
n.1.)
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ISSUE
Did the district court err by applying a subjective test to determine whether
the arresting officer had reasonable suspicion to briefly extend his traffic stop of
Smith to utilize a drug sniffing dog?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred By Applying A Subjective Test To Determine Whether
The Arresting Officer Had Reasonable Suspicion To Briefly Extend His Traffic
Stop Of Smith To Utilize A Drug Sniffing Dog
A.

Introduction
The district court recognized that by the time Officer Scheierman briefly

extended his traffic stop of Smith to deploy his drug sniffing dog, he had
reasonable suspicion to do so. (R., pp.156-157.) However, the district court still
granted Smith's motion to suppress, holding that Officer Scheierman incorrectly
believed that he had already obtained reasonable suspicion at a point much
earlier in the traffic stop. (R., pp.148-168.) The district court's reliance on Officer
Scheierman's subjective beliefs about his reasonable suspicion constituted error.
The district court thus erred in granting Smith's motion to suppress.

B.

Standard Of Review
In reviewing an order granting or denying a motion to suppress evidence,

the appellate court applies a bifurcated standard of review. State v. Purdum, 147
Idaho 206,207,207 P.3d 182, 183 (2009) (citing State v. Watts, 142 Idaho 230,
232, 127 P.3d 133, 135 (2005)). The appellate court will accept the trial court's
findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, but will freely review the trial
court's application of constitutional principles and determinations of reasonable
suspicion, in light of the facts found. Purdum, 147 Idaho at 207,207 P.3d at 183
(citing State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007)); State v.
Munoz, 149 Idaho 121,127,233 P.3d 52,58 (2010).
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C.

The Arresting Officer Had Reasonable Suspicion To Briefly Extend The
Traffic Stop To Deploy The Drug Sniffing Dog
It is well-settled that a police officer may, in compliance with the Fourth

Amendment, make an investigatory stop of an individual if that officer entertains
a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is underway. State v. Gallegos, 120
Idaho 894,896,821 P.2d 949,951 (1991). Such an investigative detention must
be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of a
stop. State v. Pannell, 127 Idaho 420, 423, 901 P.2d 1321, 1324 (1995).
Because a routine vehicle traffic stop is normally limited in scope and duration, it
is analogous to an investigative detention and is analyzed under the principles
set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648
(1979); State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App.
2003).
While a significant delay is unreasonable, officers have limited discretion
to conduct brief inquiries unrelated to the purpose of the stop. State v. Parkinson
135 Idaho 357, 362, 17 P.3d 301, 306 (Ct. App. 2000).

For example, an officer

conducting a legal traffic stop may permissibly ask for consent to search the
vehicle while the driver is still detained, when that request only momentarily
extends the stop. State v. Silva, 134 Idaho 848, 852-53, 11 P.3d 44, 48-49 (Ct.
App. 2000). An officer may also ask the driver for his license and registration,
request that the driver exit his vehicle, and ask the driver about his destination
and purpose on the road. Parkinson 135 Idaho at 363, 17 P.3d at 307; State v.
Grantham, 146 Idaho 490,496,198 P.3d 128, 134 (Ct. App. 2008).
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A detention becomes unreasonable if an officer significantly extends the
duration of the stop to investigate other criminal conduct. Sheldon, 139 Idaho at
983-984, 88 P 3d at 1223-1224. However, the purpose of a stop, and the length
of the stop to effectuate its purpose, is not necessarily fixed at the time of
initiation.

See,~,

State v. Brumfield, 136 Idaho 913, 917, 42 P.3d 706, 710

(Ct. App. 2002) ("Although the vehicular stop began as one to investigate the
operation of an unregistered automobile, information quickly developed which
justified expansion of the detention to investigate a possible drug offense.").
Thus, a routine traffic stop may be lawfully extended to deploy a drug sniffing dog
where, during the stop, the officer acquires reasonable suspicion that the driver
of the vehicle possesses drugs. 19..:.; Grantham, 146 Idaho at 497, 198 P.3d 128
at 135.
The "reasonable suspicion" standard requires an officer to articulate
specific facts which, along with the reasonable inferences from those facts, justify
the suspicion that the person is or has been involved in criminal activity.
Gallegos, 120 Idaho at 896-897, 821 P.2d at 951-952; State v. Martinez, 129
Idaho 426,430,925 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Ct. App. 1996). Reasonable suspicion is
a less demanding standard than probable cause. Gallegos, 120 Idaho at 896,
821 P.2d at 951. Whether the officer had the requisite reasonable suspicion to
detain a citizen is determined on the basis of the totality of the circumstances.
State v. Van Dome, 139 Idaho 961, 964, 88 P.3d 780, 783 (Ct. App. 2004).
Although a series of facts may appear innocent when viewed separately, they
may warrant further investigation when viewed together. Brumfield, 136 Idaho at
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917,42 P.3d at 710. The presence of reasonable suspicion is an objective test
that does not depend on the individual officer's subjective thought processes.
State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 489, 211 P.3d 91, 98 (Ct. App. 2009) (citing
Deen v. State, 131 Idaho 435,436, 958 P.2d 592, 593 (1998»; see also Whren
v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812-813 (1996).
Smith did not challenge Officer Scheierman's basis for the initial traffic
stop (see R., pp.42-49, 156), and the district court properly concluded that
neither Officer Scheierman's general inquiries about Smith's travels, nor his
request for Smith to exit the vehicle unlawfully extended the traffic stop beyond
its original purpose (R., pp.159; 162 n.15).

The district court also recognized

that prior to the return of the "nationwide check" through dispatch, at the point
Scheierman observed that Smith's eyes were "glassy and glazed over," "there is
little doubt that Scheierman had reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal
activity, marijuana or other illegal substances being used while Smith was
operating a motor vehicle." (R., pp.156-157.) The district court further noted that
"[fJrom that point forward, the [c]ourt is convinced that Scheierman's conduct was
rooted in facts that would support articulable suspicion of criminal activity
sufficient to render his subsequent conduct both reasonable and constitutionally
permissible.,,2 (R., p.157.)
Despite concluding that Officer Scheierman had reasonable suspicion that
Smith was engaged in drug activity prior to briefly extending the traffic stop to

2 The district court also recognized that a drug dog sniff of the exterior of a
vehicle does not constitute a Fourth Amendment "search." (R., p.161 n.14 (citing
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005)); see also Parkinson, 135 Idaho at 363,
17 P.3d at 307.
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deploy the drug dog, the district court still granted Smith's motion to suppress
after incorrectly applying a reasonable suspicion analysis based on Officer
Scheirman's subjective beliefs. The district court reasoned:
At some point [the traffic stop] morphed from a routine traffic
stop into an investigative stop. In fact, Scheierman notes this fact
when he testified that upon completing his initial interview of Smith
at the passenger window of Smith's vehicle he requested
assistance. He states as follows:
At this point, based on my training and
experience, I had reasonable suspicion to believe that
criminal activity was afoot and I was going to inquire
further.
Therefore, based upon Scheirman's testimony one event or
a series of events transformed this stop from a routine traffic stop to
one where Scheierman believed he had "reasonable suspicion" to
broaden the scope of the stop and detain Smith for reasons
different than the initial stop. As such, it is this period of time which
the [cJourt must analyze in determining whether or not Smith's
Fourth Amendment Rights have been infringed upon.
(R., pp.157-158.)
The district court's analysis was

incorrect.

Officer Scheierman's

subjective belief as to the moment he obtained reasonable suspicion is not
determinative of the question of when he actually extended the stop beyond its
original purpose.

Though Officer Scheierman subjectively believed he had

reasonable suspicion of Smith's drug activity after his initial contact with Smith,
Officer Scheierman did not actually extend the traffic stop beyond its original
purpose until he deployed the drug dog just after the "nationwide check" was
completed.

At that point, as the district court correctly recognized, Officer

Scheierman had reasonable suspicion of Smith's drug activity.
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The district court cited and considered State v. Aguirre, 141 Idaho 560,
112 P.3d 848 (Ct. App. 2005), a case in which the Idaho Court of Appeals held
that officers impermissibly extended the duration of a traffic stop to deploy a drug
dog. (R., pp.159-162.) The district court focused on the Idaho Court of Appeals'
concern in Aguirre that "there was no effort made to further pursue the initial
purpose of the stop." (R., p.160 (quoting Aguirre, 141 Idaho at 564, 112 P.3d at
852).)

However, in Aguirre, it was not the officer's subjective belief about

reasonable suspicion, nor the officer's subjective pursuits regarding a drug
investigation that compelled the Idaho Court of Appeals' holding.

Instead, in

Aguirre, the Idaho Court of Appeals concluded that the officers actually
abandoned the original purpose of the traffic stop. Aguirre, 141 Idaho at 562564, 112 P.3d at 850-852.

The officers in Aguirre had already contacted

dispatch and checked for outstanding warrants and other pertinent information
while trailing Aguirre's vehicle, before the traffic stop even occurred.

kL.

at 564,

112 P.3d at 852. After the officers stopped Aguirre, they questioned him about
the contents of his truck and deployed a drug dog, rather than make any effort to
further pursue the initial purpose of the stop.
Unlike

what

happened

kL.

in Aguirre,

Officer Scheierman

conducted

permissible routine warrant and license checks after he pulled Smith over, and
did not receive the results of the "nationwide check" through dispatch until just
before he deployed the drug dog, a point by which the district court recognized
that Officer Scheierman had reasonable suspicion to justify the deployment. (R.,
pp.87, 156-157; Tr., p.23, Ls.3-6; p.30, Ls.6-10.)
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Thus, the present case is

analogous to Brumfield, where the Idaho Court of Appeals held that the officers
did not unlawfully prolong a traffic stop to deploy a drug dog where the stop
revealed reasonable suspicion of drug activity while the officers were awaiting
information on the suspects from dispatch.

Brumfield, 136 Idaho 916-917, 42

P.3d at 709-710; see also Parkinson, 135 Idaho at 362-363, 17 P.3d at 306-307
(holding that it was permissible for an officer to question a vehicle's driver about
drugs and weapons and to take a drug dog around the car while another officer
was busy checking with dispatch on the driver's status and writing out a traffic
citation).
At the point Officer Scheierman believed he possessed reasonable
suspicion of Smith's drug activity, he had observed: (1) Smith roll his window
down only six to seven inches, an act Officer Scheierman testified was consistent
with someone trying to conceal contraband, or a particular smell (R., p.75; Tr.,
p.i0, Ls.6-S); (2) Smith hesitate, look at the floor of his vehicle, and give evasive
answers when asked about his travels in a manner Officer Scheierman described
as unusual for a routine traffic stop (R., pp.77-79; Tr., p.11, L.7 - p.12, L.S);

(3)

the vehicle's "lived in" appearance (garbage, food wrappers, and a cooler of
food), which Officer Scheierman testified was consistent with someone who was
reluctant to stop and pull off the main roads while traveling in order to mitigate
the risk of making contact with law enforcement (R., p.S1; Tr., p.12, L.9 - p.13,
L.3); and (4) the small amount of luggage in the vehicle was inconsistent with
Smith's story that he was traveling on vacation through several states (R., p.SO;
Tr., p.12, L.9 - p.13, L.3). Because Officer Scheierman testified that he believed
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he had reasonable suspicion that Smith was engaged in criminal activity by this
point, the district court considered only that information in its reasonable
suspicion analysis. (R., pp.157 -162.) This limited view of reasonable suspicion
was erroneous because the correct analysis requires consideration of the totality
of the circumstances at the time the stop was extended beyond its original
purpose.
The totality of the circumstances existing when Officer Scheierman was
awaiting the "nationwide check," which was related to the purpose of the original
stop, included: (1) Smith's eyes were "glassy and glazed over," consistent with
marijuana use (R., p.85; Tr., p.16, Ls.14-20);

(2) Smith's admission that he

possessed a medical marijuana card and ingested marijuana through foods (R.,
pp.85-86; Tr., p.17, Ls.9-22); and (3) Smith's continued evasiveness when
discussing his travels, and being unable to name any of the friends or specific
places he claimed to be visiting

(R., pp.84-85; Tr., p.16, Ls.9-14). Only after

Officer Scheierman obtained all of this information did the results of the
"nationwide check" come back through dispatch, and only then did Officer
Scheierman briefly extend the traffic stop to deploy his drug dog. The district
court should have considered the information possessed by Officer Scheierman
at that point, when Officer Scheierman had reasonable suspicion of Smith's drug
activity.

Consideration of the totality of the circumstances supports the

conclusion, as found by the district court, that there was reasonable articulable
suspicion of criminal activity that would permit deployment of the drug dog to
confirm or dispel that suspicion.
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The district court incorrectly conducted a reasonabie suspicion analysis
based on the subjective beliefs of Officer Scheierman. Reversal and remand for
application of the correct objective analysis is therefore appropriate.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court's
order suppressing evidence recovered in Smith's vehicle and to remand for
further proceedings
DATED this 2nd day of April 2012

MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
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